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In this paper we empirically analyze the impact of government guarantees on the risk
taking of banks in the context of a natural experiment. Until the year 2000 the German
savings banks and federal state banks (\Landesbanken") were protected by government
guarantees.1 In July 2001 the European Union, based on the outcome of a lawsuit at
the European Court of Justice, ordered that the guarantees must be discontinued in two
steps during 2001 to 2005.2 Using a unique panel data set consisting of matched balance
sheet information for all German savings banks and their commercial loan customers for
1996 to 2006, we estimate the eect the removal had on credit risk, loan volumes, and
interest rates of savings banks. Taking advantage of this natural experiment we are able
to identify the eect of government guarantees on banks' credit portfolio choices and risk
taking.
We nd that the removal of government guarantees resulted in a signicant reduc-
tion in credit risk. Credit risk decreased signicantly more in banks, for which the value
of guarantees was higher ex ante. Savings banks shifted their portfolios towards safer
borrowers by dropping existing borrowers with higher credit risk and by tightening their
lending standards for new borrowers. Total credit volumes and loan sizes were reduced.
Despite the reduction in credit risk, savings banks increased loan interest rates on the
remaining customers. The results are particularly striking, if one recognizes that the risk
of banks' customers declined, even though the German economy suered an economic
downturn in 2002/2003, i.e. right after the removal of guarantees (Figure 2). Hence, in
an environment of deteriorating quality of loan applicants, the quality of those that were
granted a loan by savings banks improved signicantly. Subsequently, the market share
of savings banks in the lending business to non-nancials fell from 22% to 21% after the
removal (Figure 3).
Public guarantees in the wake of the nancial crisis of 2007/2008 have been wide-
1We provide more detail on the institutional structure of German savings banks in section 2.
2Several major newspapers commented on the court decision. See for example Financial Times \Solution to Five-year
Battle Welcomed by Private Sector" and Wall Street Journal \Germany to End State Guarantees for Public Banks", both
on 18 July, 2001.
1spread. Most countries either nationalized banks (e.g., U.S.: Indy Mac, Fannie Mae,
Freddy Mac; UK: Bradford Bingley, Northern Rock, RBS, HBOS, Lloyds; Germany: IKB,
Hypo Real Estate; Belgium/Netherlands: Dexia, Fortis), provided blanked guarantees for
the banking system (e.g., Germany, Italy) or both. Evidence on the likely eect of such
intervention on bank risk taking is scarce, as in most cases guarantees are granted in
the midst of a crisis, in which case the eects of the guarantees on the portfolio risk of
banks are confounded by the eects of the crisis itself on portfolio risk of banks. To
disentangle the two is very dicult in such a setting. In this paper we do not consider the
introduction of government guarantees, but rather their removal. Further, the removal
was not prompted by a nancial event, but exogenously imposed by a court decision.
The period under consideration in this paper, 1996 to 2006, was a period without major
nancial system incidence in Germany and hence is particularly well suited to identify the
eects of behavioral changes in response to changes in the safety net.3
Theory would tell us that there are two eects of public guarantees on bank risk
taking that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, government guarantees may
reduce market discipline because creditors anticipate their bank's bail-out and therefore
have lower incentives to monitor the bank's risk-taking or to demand risk premia for
higher observed risk-taking (Flannery, 1998; Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 2006). This tends
to increase the protected banks' risk-taking. The eect is similar to the well-known moral
hazard eect discussed in the deposit insurance literature (see e.g., Merton (1977) or more
recently Ruckes (2004)). If depositors are protected by a guarantee, they will punish their
bank less for risk-taking, reducing market discipline. On the other hand, government
guarantees also aect banks' risk-taking through their eect on banks' margins and char-
ter values. Keeley (1990) was the rst to argue that higher charter values decrease the
incentives for risk-taking, because the threat of losing future rents acts as a deterrent.
Government bail-out guarantees result in higher charter values for protected banks who
benet from lower renancing costs. Hence, government guarantees may alternatively be
3This is not to say that there were no nancial incidents at all; rather the eects of the Russian default (1998), LTCM
(1998), or the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 on German savings banks were very mild (Hackethal and Schmidt, 2005).
2viewed as an implicit subsidy to the banks and through their future value decrease bank
risk taking.
Ultimately, as argued by Cordella and Yeyati (2003) and by Hakenes and Schnabel
(2009), the net eect of government bail-out guarantees on the risk-taking of banks is
ambiguous and depends on the relative importance of the two channels. Which dominates
is an empirical matter.4
Empirically, the literature tends to conclude that banks increase their risk-taking
in the presence of government guarantees, but the evidence is far from unambiguous. For
example, Hovakimian and Kane (2000) show evidence for higher risk-taking of banks in the
presence of deposit insurance. Large banks { which may be perceived to be \too big to fail"
{ have been shown to follow riskier strategies than smaller banks (Boyd and Runkle, 1993;
Boyd and Gertler, 1994; Gropp et al., 2009). The ndings on the relationship between
bank size and failure probabilities are mixed. De Nicol o (2001) and De Nicol o et al.
(2004) document higher probabilities of failure for larger banks. In contrast, De Nicol o
and Loukoianova (2007) nd that public banks do not appear to follow riskier strategies
than private banks. Finally, Sapienza (2004) shows that public banks charge lower interest
rates for given riskiness of loans, which is consistent with the results presented in this
paper.
The eect of government bail-out guarantees on overall banking system stability are
also mixed in the literature. Demirg u c-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) present evidence for
a negative eect of deposit insurance on banking stability, pointing towards a destabiliz-
ing eect of guarantees. Similarly, some papers nd a negative relationship between bank
stability and government ownership (Caprio and Mart nez Per a, 2000) or bank concen-
tration (De Nicol o et al., 2004). However, there also exist papers that are consistent with
no or even a stabilizing eect of government guarantees. Barth et al. (2004) show that
government ownership has no robust impact on bank fragility, once one controls for bank-
ing regulation and supervisory practices. Beck et al. (2006) nd that systemic banking
4The presence of government guarantees may not only aect the risk-taking of protected banks, but also { through
competition { that of the protected banks' competitors (Gropp et al., 2009).
3crises are less likely in countries with more concentrated banking sectors.
Most of these papers rely on cross-country or cross-sectional variation in public
guarantees to identify their eect. In contrast, in this paper we are able to take advantage
of a unique natural experiment within one country for a homogeneous set of relatively
small banks. We view the small size of the banks in our sample (mean total assets of
Euro 1.9 billion, see section 5.6) as an advantage. If public guarantees were removed for
a set of very large banks, these banks may remain \too big to fail" and therefore still be
subject to an implicit government guarantee, rather than an explicit one (Gropp et al.,
2009). Further, we can use the link between banks and their customers to obtain a precise
measure of bank risk taking and are not forced to rely on bank accounting measures such
as problem loans.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two gives some institu-
tional background on German savings banks and describes the events surrounding the loss
of government guarantees. A description of the data set can be found in section three.
Section four presents our empirical strategy and section ve discusses the empirical results.
Section six concludes.
2 Institutional background
The German banking market is almost evenly split between three types of banks: savings
and federal state banks (the focus of this paper), credit cooperatives (\Volks- und Raif-
feisenbanken"), and commercial banks.5 It is characterized by a low level of concentration
with around 450 dierent savings banks, more than 1,000 credit cooperatives, and around
300 privately owned commercial banks.
Taken as a group, savings banks in Germany have more than Euro 1 trillion in
total assets and 22,000 branches. German savings banks focus on traditional banking
business with virtually no o-balance sheet operations. Their main nancing source are
customer deposits, which they transform into loans to households and small and medium
5For an in depth description of the German banking market see Hackethal (2004).
4sized enterprises.6 Savings banks are owned by the local government of the community
they operate in. One important dierence between commercial banks and savings banks
is that savings banks in Germany are obliged by law to serve the \common good" of their
community by providing households and local rms with easy access to credit. They do
not compete with each other, as a regional separation applies: each savings bank uniquely
serves its local market (similar to the geographic banking restrictions that existed up
to the 1990s in the U.S.). Each savings bank is aliated with one federal state bank
(\Landesbank") and each federal state bank is aliated with a state (\Bundesland")
or group of states. The aliated savings banks own each a part of their federal state
bank. The federal state banks act as regional clearing houses for liquidity and facilitate
the transfer of liquidity from savings banks with excess liquidity to those with liquidity
shortfalls. In addition, the federal state banks secure market funding through the issuance
of bonds.
Until the year 2000, both the German savings banks and federal state banks were
protected by government guarantees (\Gewaehrtraegerhaftung"). As a consequence their
bonds were generally rated triple A or slightly below. As German savings banks compete
with commercial banks for retail and commercial customers, commercial banks in Germany
alleged that the government guarantees resulted in a signicant competitive advantage for
savings banks. Prompted by these allegations, the European Union led a lawsuit against
the government guarantees at the European Court of Justice in April 2000. The subsequent
court decision in July 2001 resulted in the removal of guarantees for savings banks and
federal state banks in two steps: during a transition period from July 18, 2001 to July
18, 2005, newly contracted obligations (such as bonds or commercial paper) continue to
be secured by government guarantees if their maturity is shorter than December 31, 2015.
In a second step, starting from July 18, 2005 all newly contracted obligations will no
longer be covered. Obligations contracted before July 18, 2001 are grandfathered. This
implies that our sample largely covers the transition period between the full existence of
6Savings banks also issue some covered bonds and certicates of deposits that have characteristics similar to subordinated
debt (Hackethal, 2004).
5the guarantees (until 2001) and their complete removal (2005). Hence, we check the extent
to which the expectation of their complete removal aected bank behavior.7
3 Data
3.1 Main data sources
We use a proprietary data set provided by the German Savings Banks Association for the
years 1996 to 2006 which symmetrically spans the removal of government guarantees in
2001. The data set provides annual balance sheets and income statements of all commercial
loan customers of all 457 German savings banks aliated with the German Savings Banks
Association.8 It includes data of around 87,702 customers after excluding missing values
and requiring at least two consecutive observations in order to be able to use lagged
variables in the empirical analysis. In total there are 230,562 observations in the data set.
Hence, there are around 2.6 annual observations per customer on average. The borrowers
are largely small and medium sized enterprises with an average of Euro 1.6 million in total
assets. They strongly rely on bank loans as the mean loan ratio is 51%.
To control for savings bank characteristics, we also use annual balance sheets for
the 457 savings banks. The savings bank data is also from the German Savings Banks
Association. By using this proprietary data set, the sample size is much larger than by
using public sources such as Bankscope. In order to ensure some degree of anonymity
of customers, the matching of borrowers to savings banks is possible only aggregated in
groups of 5-12 savings banks. In total, there are 65 savings bank groups. Hence, while
we have precise information on the individual customer, we only know that the customer
banked with any one of the group. We thus link the customer characteristics to the average
of the group of savings banks, rather than to an individual savings bank.
7Technically, the \Gewaehrtraegerhaftung" and the \Anstaltslast" were abolished. The \Anstaltslast" describes the
obligation of the government to provide all state-owned enterprises with \sucient resources to carry out their tasks". In
that sense the savings banks considered in this paper could technically not become insolvent before 2001. In the change
in legislation of 2001 it explicitly stipulates that federal state banks and savings banks from then on have the \ability to
become insolvent".
8There are seven savings banks that are not full members in the savings banks association. They are not covered in the
data set.
6A. Dependent variables
Table 1 provides the denitions and data sources of all variables we use. As a measure for
the credit risk at the borrower level we use the Z-Score (Altman, 1968) calibrated to the
German banking market (Engelmann et al., 2003):9
Z Score = 0:717  Working capital=Assets + 0:847  Retained earnings=Assets+
3:107  Net profits=Assets + 0:420  Net worth=Liabilities + 0:998  Sales=Assets
A higher Z Score indicates a lower risk associated with the borrower. It is important
to emphasize that we calculate the Z-Score based on borrower data. We do not rely on
internal credit risk indicators of the savings banks themselves. The internal assessment
may be problematic, as savings banks may have incentives to review their internal ratings
of borrowers after the removal of government guarantees.
Loan size are the borrower's liabilities towards the savings bank. As savings banks
are prohibited from competing with each other, borrowers in a certain region get loans
only from their local savings bank. In case a borrower has several loans outstanding at
the reporting date, our proxy for loan size is the total loan volume outstanding to the
customer.
We approximate borrower level interest rates from the borrowers' balance sheets
as interest expenses over total loan volume. The loan volume of borrowers may, however,
also contain loans from the savings banks' competitors. Hence, we only include data
from commercial borrowers with more than 50% share of total loan volumes from savings
banks.10 Interest rate spread is then calculated as the dierence between the savings
banks loan interest rate and the risk-free rate. We use the annual return of ve-year
German government bonds as the risk-free rate (taken from the German central bank)
since the term to maturity of the average loan is between four and ve years (information
taken from savings banks' balance sheets).
9We replace EBIT by Net profits due to better data availability.
10Results remain qualitatively the same if we use an alternative cuto value of 100% (section 5.1).
7B. Independent variables
In the baseline analysis, the central variable of interest is NoStateG which is a dummy
variable distinguishing between the period when savings banks enjoyed a public guarantee
(1996 to 2000) and the period when they did not (2001 to 2006). We set the post 2001
period equal to one. Hence, the dummy divides the period of observation into two parts
of almost equal size and measures whether bank behavior changed after the removal of
public guarantees in 2001.
As we can link borrowers to groups of savings banks, we use a number of bank
group level variables to control for bank group level heterogeneity. For example, we use
the savings bank groups' total assets, Total bank assets, to control for a variety of the-
ories related to bank size. Demsetz and Strahan (1997), among others, emphasize that
larger banks can more easily diversify. In our setting, this implies that larger banks are
able to lend to individually riskier borrowers without increasing overall portfolio risk. In
the specication with Z Score as the dependent variable, diversication would imply a
negative coecient for Total bank assets. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2006), using a data
set of individual loan customers, show that diversication tends to result in higher risk at
the individual loan level. They argue that this increase in risk at the individual loan level
stems from a decline in monitoring by larger banks. Monitoring declines, because agency
problems within banks (between management and loan ocers) may increase with bank
size (Stein, 2002; Goetz, 2010).
At the same time, large banks may enjoy economies of scale in lending (see for
example Berger and Mester (1997)). In a competitive environment, these cost savings
may be passed on to borrowers in the form of lower interest rates. Hence, this would sug-
gest a negative coecient of Total bank assets in the Interest rate spread specication.
Finally, Berger et al. (2005) show that larger banks tend to lend to larger borrowers. If
larger borrowers ultimately obtain larger loans, we would expect a positive coecient of
Total bank assets in the Loan size specication.
We control for the regional level of competition (Boyd and De Nicol o, 2005), Direct
8competition, by using the ratio of branches of direct competitors (commercial banks and
cooperative banks) to savings banks branches per group of savings banks and year. The
data comes from the Bundesbank.11 In line with Keeley (1990) and Dick (2006), we
expect that banks lend more aggressively in more competitive markets (higher risk, larger
volume and lower interest rates). Further, Number mergers contains the number of
mergers within a group of savings banks per year and controls for potential eects that
merged banks tend to weaken bank/rm relationships, which may aect loan conditions
(Di Patti and Gobbi, 2007).12
 GDP is the regional change in annual GDP per group of savings banks and
controls for demand eects as well as for varying levels of credit risk (Borio et al., 2001).
In addition, we use the level of local GDP to control, for instance, for dierences in regional
economic development. Indebtedness is the average debt per capita of the community that
the savings bank is located in. With this variable we attempt to control for dierences in
the nancial strength of the savings banks' owners.13 Both variables come from the federal
statistical oce of Germany (\Destatis"). We also use 16 sectoral dummies following the
two-digit classication of industries by the federal statistical oce of Germany. In addition,
we employ Risk-free interest rate, which is the average daily risk-free interest rate at
the national level (Bundesbank data), in order to control for the relationship between
interest rates and credit risk as there is a growing body of literature showing that low
short-term interest rates may be related to softer lending standards and increased risk
taking (Ioannidou et al., 2009; Jim enez et al., 2008).
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables that we use. The rst three variables
will serve as dependent variables in the regressions below. The average Z-Score is 2.5 with
a 5% percentile of 0.2 and a 95% percentile of 6.1. On average, borrowers have loans from
11The data covers the year 1996-2004. Thus, as the data ends too early, we assume that competition remained unchanged
in 2005/2006 and use the 2004 data in these two years.
12However, Berger et al. (1998) provide evidence that reduced small business lending is oset by the reactions of other
banks.
13Recall that all savings banks are at least in part owned by the local community it operates in.
9savings banks of Euro 530,000 outstanding. The median amount outstanding is Euro
215,000. The average interest rate spread is 6.7% with a standard deviation of 19.7%.
Total bank assets per group of savings banks are Euro 15.3 billion on average.
The 5% percentile is Euro 5.5 million while the 95% percentile is Euro 39.2 billion.14
On average, the savings banks' federal state banks were downgraded by two and a half
rating notches after the removal of state guarantees. The impact of the removal of public
guarantees on the assessment of rating agencies was substantial and diered substantially
across federal state banks. Some were only downgraded by one and one half notches, while
others were downgraded by four notches. In the absence of ratings for savings banks, we
use this variation in downgrades combined with the unique association between savings
banks and a certain federal state bank later in the paper to identify the eect of guarantees
in the cross section (section 5.2). The number of direct competitors is less than one on
average, indicating a rather low level of competition. On average, the savings bank groups
were involved in 24% of the years with a merger. Local communities the savings banks
were operating in were indebted by Euro 1,040 per capita on average. The average growth
rate was 0.7% and average daily interest rates were 3% on an annual basis during our
sample period.
As a rst cut at how the removal of government guarantees aected the banks'
risk taking, we present univariate results of the dependent variables in Panel A of Table
3. Looking at the development of the borrowers' Z-Scores we observe a general trend to
a reduction of credit risk from 1996/2000 to 2001/2006 as the average Z-Score increased
by 0.20 from 2.36 to 2.56 (8.5%), which is signicant at the 1% level. Figure 1 further
illustrates this point. It shows that savings banks reduced lending to commercial customers
with a Z-Score between 1.0 and 3.0 in favor for less risky clients with a higher Z-Score
(3.5 and above). It appears that the savings banks tried to reduce largely the proportion
of very risky borrowers in their portfolios. In the second row of Panel A, we also see that
savings banks reduced loan sizes to individual borrowers by Euro 78,000 or 13.4%. Row
14To account for outliers, we winsorize the rst four variables on the 0.5%/99.5% level.
10three shows that this reduction in customer risk and loan sizes was associated with higher
interest rates spreads as, on average, the savings banks increased their interest rate margin
by 112 basis points or 18.8%. Both results are signicant at the 1 percent level.
4 Empirical strategy
In this paper we are interested in the eect of government guarantees on bank behavior.
Recall the two main predictions that we take from the literature. First, if the moral hazard
eect of guarantees dominates, we would expect banks to reduce their risk taking after
the removal of the guarantees (Flannery, 1998; Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 2006). Second,
if the charter value eect, that is the implicit subsidy, dominates, we would expect savings
banks to increase their risk taking (Keeley, 1990). Changing risk taking due to the removal
of government guarantees would then be reected in decreasing (moral hazard eect) or
increasing (charter value eect) lending to riskier borrowers. The predictions for interest
rates charged are ambiguous. If the moral hazard eect dominates, we would expect
interest rates charged not to decline on the pool of borrowers left after the removal of
guarantees, consistent with ndings that public rms tend to charge lower interest rates
for a given level of riskiness (Sapienza, 2004). If the charter value eect dominates, we
would expect interest rates not to increase after the removal. We think the ability to
control for the level of interest rates charged is a strength of the paper, because it permits
us to control for changes in risk premia charged by banks when examing changes in the
risk of borrowers. If any change in the riskiness of banks' customers was associated with a
corresponding change in risk premia charged, it would be dicult to draw rm conclusions
on the overall risk incurred by banks.
The removal of the guarantees took place in 2001, in the middle of our observation
period. One major advantage of our data set is that the removal was exogenously imposed
by a court decision and thus creates a unique natural experiment. We rst consider
whether we can detect any dierences in the Z-Scores, loan sizes, and interest rates charged
to borrowers before and after 2001, controlling for bank group characteristics and local
11economic conditions, and thus identify the eect of the removal by the time series variation
only. In particular, we use the three dependent variables Y (i;t) on the borrower level i,
Z Score(i;t), Loan size(i;t), and Interest rate spread(i;t) in
Y (i;t) =  +  NoStateG(t)
+ 1 X1(i;t) + 2 X2(g;t) + 3 X3(t) + "(i;t) (1)
where the variable of interest is NoStateG(t). It is a dummy variable distinguishing
between 1996 to 2000 (equals zero) and 2001 to 2006 (equals one). The vector X1(i;t)
includes the control variables (and a full set of two-digit industry dummies) which are
on the borrower level, X2(g;t) includes the local GDP growth, local GDP level, local
banking competition, local merger history, and total savings bank assets which are all
on the savings bank group level g, and X3(t) is the daily risk-free interest rate. As we
potentially face a simultaneity problem among our set of variables we lag our indepen-
dent variables Z Score(i;t   1), Loan size(i;t   1), Interest rate spread(i;t   1), and
Total bank assets(g;t 1) by one year and include them as further independent variables
(Acharya et al., 2006).15 We estimate all specications using OLS with cluster robust
standard errors at the savings bank group level, thus allowing for unobserved correlation
between observations from the same savings bank group (Froot, 1989).
5 Results
5.1 Baseline results
While we found the univariate results in section 3.2 encouraging, it is possible, for instance,
that the eects are due to regional dierences across local markets. Hence, in Table 4
we present the baseline results for the three dependent variables Z Score, Loan size,
and Interest rate spread using specication (1), controlling for a host of local market
15We do not lag Number mergers as most mergers are reported at the beginning of the calendar year. In addition, we
explore other ways to deal with simultaneity in section 5.4.
12characteristics. The variable of interest is NoStateG, which takes the value one for the
period after the removal of government guarantees (2001 to 2006) and zero before.
Panel A of Table 4 shows pooled OLS regression results. We nd that the NoStateG
coecient is positive (lower risk) and signicant at any signicance level in the rst column.
The commercial loan customers of savings banks exhibited lower risk in the period after
the removal of the government guarantee. The coecient is 0.17 and thus almost as large
as in the univariate analysis. Thus, the average borrower has an 7.3% higher Z-Score after
the removal of government guarantees than before. This dierence indicates not only a
statistically signicant but also an economically relevant reduction in credit risk.
In the second column of Panel A we show that NoStateG also enters signicantly
(1% level) into the regression for loan size. We nd that savings banks signicantly
reduced loan sizes after the removal of government guarantees. The average reduction
is economically large at Euro 77,000 or 13%. Further, we nd that interest rate spreads
charged (column 3 of Panel A) were signicantly increased (signicant at the 1% level).
However, the average increase is 57 basis points or 9.6%, smaller than the 112 basis points
in the univariate analysis, suggesting that regional dierences matter for interest rate
spreads charged. Both ndings corroborate our main nding: Savings banks signicantly
reduced their risk taking after the government guarantees were removed.
Most control variables conform to expectations. We nd that larger banks tend to
originate larger loans. However, bank size is not related to the level of credit risk and
interest rate spread. We further nd evidence that savings banks in regions where the
federal state bank was downgraded more severely had a lower level of credit risk. We will
examine this relationship more closely in a dierence-in-dierences specication in part
A of section 5.2. If the savings banks' communities were more indebted, credit risk was
higher. Furthermore, higher competition yields riskier lending but is unrelated to loan size
and interest rate spread. If local GDP grew more rapidly, the customers of savings banks
tend to exhibit lower risk although this relationship does not enter signicantly. Finally,
low overall levels of interest rates in the economy result in riskier borrowers, larger loans
13and lower interest rate spreads. As in Ioannidou et al. (2009) and Jim enez et al. (2008) a
low level of interest rates tends to be related to softer lending standards.
We next present and discuss the results of a series of additional tests to illustrate
the robustness of our ndings from the baseline regressions. First, we use savings bank
group xed eects. Results are shown in Panel B of Table 4. Our main results remain
qualitatively unchanged. The NoStateG coecient still enters signicantly (at the 1%
level) in all three regressions with the credit risk, the loan size, and the interest rate
spread as dependent variables. Results thus seem to be robust to controlling for time-
invariant saving bank group characteristics. Second, it seems plausible that savings banks
may have expected the law suit to go against them and wanted to extend as many risky
loans under the old regime. If so, this may imply that they increased their lending to risky
borrowers after the law suit was led in April 2000 and stopped after the law suit was
decided in July 2001. We thus perform a robustness check with the years 2000 and 2001
dropped. The number of observations decreases from 230,562 to 168,006. Unreported
results regarding the NoStateG coecient remain qualitatively unchanged. Our ndings
hence do not seem to be driven by savings banks increasing risk levels shortly before the
court decision in combination with a decline in risk levels in 2001. Third, we use a dierent
sample denition. In our analyses we approximate borrower level interest rates from the
borrowers' balance sheets. The loan volume of borrowers may, however, also contain loans
from the savings banks' competitors. Hence, in the baseline, we only include data from
commercial borrowers with more than 50% share of total loan volumes from savings banks.
As a robustness check, we require that all loans come from savings banks. When doing
this, the number of observations declines to 103,407. Again, the NoStateG coecient
enters signicantly at the 1% level in the risk and interest rate regressions, while we
obtain a signicance level of 10% for the loan size regression. Overall, the results turn out
to be robust to bank group xed eects, dierent sample selection criteria and omitting
2000/2001 from the analysis.
While we feel reasonably condent that the results above indeed are driven by
14the removal of guarantees, their identication relies only on time series variation in the
behavior of savings banks. Hence, it is possible that all banks reduced their risk taking
after 2001. If this were the case, the eect of the removal of government guarantees
would be confounded by a general time series trend. We should, however, emphasize that
Germany experienced a recession in 2002/2003 (see Figure 2), suggesting an overall decline
in the quality of the pool of potential borrowers. Despite this decline in the quality in
the pool of potential borrowers, we nd an improvement in the quality of the accepted
borrowers for the savings banks. We further nd that the savings banks' market share
in lending to commercial borrowers decreased after the removal of the public guarantees.
Figure 3 suggests that savings banks' market share was relatively stable at around 22%
before 1999. Then we observe an increase of around 1.5% in the years 1999 and 2000.
That might have been an anticipation of the forthcoming regulatory change. In the years
2001 and (to a lesser extend) 2002, we observe a drop to around 20% and after that a
stable market share of around 21%. The removal of state guarantees thus corresponds
to a lower market share of savings banks. Savings banks changed their lending behavior
after the removal of guarantees more than their competitors, which were not aected by
the removal of public guarantees.16 Nevertheless, in the next section we show the results
for two attempts at identifying the eect of public guarantees in the cross section as well
as the time series.
5.2 Higher ex ante value of guarantees
In this section we identify the eect of the removal of government guarantees using a
dierence-in-dierences approach. We would expect that the eects on the behavior of
savings banks should be larger if the value of the government guarantees to the savings
banks was larger ex ante. We measure the eect of the ex ante value of guarantees in two
ways: One, we use the extent of the downgrade of the federal state bank aliated with
the set of savings banks. And second, we check whether ex ante riskier banks reduced
16In section 5.6 we further show evidence that loan volume was reduced at individual savings banks after the removal of
public guarantees.
15their risk taking more than ex ante safer banks.
A. Downgrade of federal state banks
Table 5 shows that the removal of government guarantees resulted in a downgrade of
federal state banks by 2-3 rating notches on average. In the absence of ratings for savings
banks and given the institutional structure of the system (see section 2), we use dierences
in these downgrades to identify the eect of guarantees on the behavior of savings banks.
The downgrade of federal state banks may have aected individual savings banks via two
main channels: First, in their function as clearing houses for individual savings banks.
Savings banks, even though not rated and generally without direct access to international
capital markets, were able to renance at (almost) risk-free terms via the federal savings
banks (Wagner, 2002). After the downgrade, renancing with federal state banks may
have become signicantly more expensive for individual savings banks. Further, this
eect may have been stronger, the larger the downgrade of the associated federal state
bank.17 Second, the equity stake of savings banks in the federal state bank may have been
aected. Indeed during the recent crisis, a number of savings banks provided capital to
failing federal state banks (e.g., in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg the savings banks
supported a recapitalization of the federal state bank with Euro 1.78 billion).18
We hypothesize that the removal of government guarantees may have had stronger
eects for savings banks aliated with federal state banks that were downgraded more
severely and where therefore the ex ante value of the guarantee was higher. We rst provide
univariate statistics using the third column in Panel A of Table 3 to calculate dierence-
in-dierences combining before/after the removal of government guarantees with high/low
downgrade magnitude. We nd that the increase in Z-Score is higher (0.12) if we observe a
large downgrade (0.28) than if we observe a small downgrade (0.16). Credit risk decreased
more if the value of the government guarantees was more valuable ex ante. The dierence-
in-dierences is signicant at the 10% level and accounts for 60% of the overall decrease
17Recall that the regional principle applies: each savings bank is aliated with one particular federal state bank, see
section 2.
18Cf. Handelsblatt newspaper article from March 16th, 2009. Puri et al. (2009) examine the eect these bail-outs may
have had on savings banks lending policies.
16of the Z-Score (0.20). For the loan size, the dierence-in-dierences is minus Euro 99,000
(signicant at the 5% level) and is thus even larger than the overall eect (minus Euro
78,000). Savings banks for which the ex ante value of guarantees was higher increased
interest rates by 154 basis points, as opposed to 92 basis points for other savings banks.
The dierence-in-dierences is thus 62 basis points (signicant at the 10% level) or 55%
of the overall eect (112 basis points).
In line with the descriptive statistics, we estimate a dierence-in-dierences model,
which permits an identication of the eect of the removal of government guarantees in
the cross section (ex ante value of guarantees) as well as the time series:
Y (i;t) =  + 1 NoStateGXHighDowng(g;t)
+ 2 NoStateGXLowDowng(g;t) + 3 StateGXLowDowng(g;t)
+ 1 X1(i;t) + 2 X2(g;t) + 3 X3(t) + "(i;t): (2)
The key variables are the three interaction terms. We are interested in the change
in lending behavior before (StateG) and after (NoStateG) the removal of government
guarantees for the savings bank groups which are tied to federal state banks with a more
severe (HighDowng) and less severe credit rating downgrade (LowDowng). We thus base
our inference on 1 - (2 - 3).
The results in Table 6 show that the reduction in risk, the reduction in loan size,
and the increase in interest rate spread were all signicantly larger for savings banks
that beneted ex ante more strongly from the government guarantee. The dierence-in-
dierences terms enter signicantly into the regression for all three dependent variables (at
the 5% level for credit risk and interest rate spread, at the 10% level for loan size). Banks,
for which the ex ante value of government guarantees was likely to be higher, reduced
their risk taking more than other banks.
B. Higher ex ante risk
In this section we identify the value of ex ante guarantees on the basis of risk taking
17before the removal of the guarantee. If the guarantee resulted in moral hazard eects,
their removal should result in a stronger reaction for those banks that incurred greater
risk with the guarantee in place. If the charter value eect dominates, we would not
necessarily expect a dierence in the reaction of ex ante riskier and ex ante safer banks.
We measure the ex ante riskiness of the savings bank as the average Z-Score of their
borrowers before the removal of government guarantees. To identify the dierence in
reaction we dene two groups of savings banks: HighRisk stands for savings banks with
below average Z-Score before 2001, while LowRisk stand for savings banks with above
average Z-Score, respectively.
Panel B in Table 3 presents the univariate results. We observe a stronger increase
in the average Z-Score after the removal of government guarantees for ex ante riskier banks
(0.29) compared to ex ante less risky banks (0.08). The dierence-in-dierences is 0.21
(signicant at the 1% level). In addition, the decrease of the average loan volume was
stronger for riskier (Euro 106,000) than for safer banks (Euro 59,000). The dierence-
in-dierences is negative but not signicant. The average interest rate spread was raised
more strongly (132 basis points compared to 80 basis points). The resulting dierence-in-
dierences (52 basis points) is statistically signicant at the 10% level.
As before, we estimate the following dierence-in-dierences model, which identies
the eects of the removal of government guarantees in the cross section (level of ex ante
risk) and the time series:
Y (i;t) =  + 1 NoStateGXHighRisk(g;t)
+ 2 NoStateGXLowRisk(g;t) + 3 StateGXLowRisk(g;t)
+ 1 X1(i;t) + 2 X2(g;t) + 3 X3(t) + "(i;t): (3)
Again, the key variables are the three interaction terms. We are interested in
the change in lending behavior before (StateG) and after (NoStateG) the removal of
government guarantees for the savings bank groups with lower (LowRisk) and higher
18(HighRisk) ex ante riskiness. We thus base our inference on 1 - (2 - 3).
The results in Table 7 show that the reduction in risk, the reduction in loan size,
and the increase in interest rate spreads were all larger for savings banks which carried
a higher credit risk before the removal of state guarantees. The dierence-in-dierences
terms enter signicantly into the regression for credit risk (at the 1% level) and interest
rate spread (at the 10% level) while the dierence-in-dierences is negative but does not
enter signicantly in the case of loan size. Ex ante riskier banks appear to have reduced
their risk taking more after the removal of guarantees relative to ex ante safer banks.
5.3 Introduction of risk based regulation and prompt corrective action
We want to be sure that the eects we describe above are indeed due to the removal of
guarantees and not due to subsequent changes in the regulatory framework. Each savings
bank in Germany is required to contribute to a regional reserve fund. These funds, intro-
duced in the 1970s, are intended to safeguard the liquidity and solvency of each individual
bank. In December 2003 (two years after the removal of guarantees) it was announced
that the contributions to the reserve fund would be changed from at contributions to risk
based contributions based on the portfolio risk of each savings bank. The volume of the
fund was also increased. Finally a risk monitoring system was introduced and intervention
rights of the reserve fund were strengthened. The reserve fund can ask savings banks to
provide further details on its exposures, it may set up meetings with the board of directors
and management of the savings bank and a restructuring of the aected savings bank can
be imposed. The reforms, which became eective in 2006, can be viewed as introducing a
form of prompt corrective action.
While the implementation of these reforms took place in 2006, the last year of our
sample period, we want to make sure that the changes in bank behavior were not due to the
expectation of these regulatory changes becoming eective. It is possible that by dividing
the time period into 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2006, we mistakenly attributed eects
that occurred due to the announcement of the introduction of changes in the regulatory
19framework in December 2003 to the removal of public guarantees. Hence, in the results
reported in Table 8, we divide the sample into three sub-periods:
 1996/2000: Government guarantees are in place (StateG)
 2001/2003: Guarantees no longer in place, no risk based regulation
 2004/2006: Guarantees no longer in place, risk based regulation announced (IntroRW)
Dividing the sample in this way highlights that we can identify the eect of the
removal of government guarantees by considering the change in risk taking in 2001/2003
relative to 1996/2000 (StateG). However, we cannot unambiguously attribute any further
eects (the coecient IntroRW for the 2004/2006 period) to either the removal of guar-
antees or the introduction of regulation, as this period will reect a combination of both
eects. Still, it seems interesting in its own right to check whether after 2003 there were
additional eects on bank risk taking. Hence, we estimate:
Y (i;t) =  + 1 StateG(t) + 2 IntroRW(t)
+ 1 X1(i;t) + 2 X2(j;t) + 3 X3(t) + "(i;t) (4)
The rst variable of interest in the results for this exercise is StateG. The results
in Table 8 show that savings banks reduced their risk taking in 2001/2003 as StateG is
negative in the rst column. We further nd that the borrowers' loan sizes (column 2) were
reduced and the interest rate spreads charged (column 3) were increased signicantly. All
three coecients are signicant at the 1% level. The eect of the removal of government
guarantees on risk taking is robust to controlling for the subsequent introduction of risk
based regulation and prompt corrective action.
The results also suggest that savings banks reduced their risk taking further in
2004/2006 (IntroRW is positive and signicant at the 1% level), although we do not nd
a signicant eect for loan size and interest rate spreads. Overall, we would interpret the
evidence as suggestive that risk based regulation reduced risk taking further, although
20we cannot fully distinguish the eect from a potential late adjustment to the removal of
government guarantees.
5.4 SUR model
In this section, we use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model to account for the
simultaneity of the risk, loan size, and interest rate decisions by banks. In Table 9 we
report the results of:
Z Score(i;t) =  +  NoStateG(t) + 1 X1(i;t) + 2 X2(j;t) + 3 X3(t) + "1(i;t)
Loan size(i;t) =  +  NoStateG(t) + 1 X1(i;t) + 2 X2(j;t) + 3 X3(t) + "2(i;t)
Interest rate spread(i;t) =  +  NoStateG(t) + 1 X1(i;t) + 2 X2(j;t) + 3 X3(t) + "3(i;t)
(5)
The model allows for a correlated error structure across the error terms of the
three equations. We estimate the model for the baseline specication as well as the two
dierence-in-dierences models and the model, in which we control for the subsequent
announcement of a change in regulation.19 The other control variables are as before
except the vector X1(i;t) which only includes the set of industry dummies.
All results go through as before: Savings banks reduced risk taking, reduced loan
size and increased interest rate spreads after the government guarantees were removed (I).
The eect is stronger, if the ex ante value of the government guarantees were higher (IIa
and IIb). All dierence-in-dierences terms in the credit risk and interest rate regressions
are signicant at the 1% level. In the case of the loan size regressions, only the dierence-
in-dierences term of specication IIa enters signicantly at the 5% level. Specication
(III) is also in line with earlier results. All in all, our results do not seem to suer from
simultaneity problems.
19Note that we only show the baseline in specication (5) to save space.
215.5 Screening versus monitoring
Our matched bank/borrower data set provides a direct possibility to investigate whether
banks changed their screening or their monitoring policies or both. In order to disentangle
screening from monitoring, we create two subsamples of our borrower level data set. One
includes only new and the second only existing borrowers. Figure 4 shows how we dene
the two subsamples. It illustrates four exemplary borrowers of a given bank. First, we
exclude all observations for 1995 (denoted in Figure 4 with B), because for 1995 we are
unable to distinguish whether the observations refers to an existing or a new borrower.
Second, if we observe a borrower in 1995 and 1996 or a subsequent year, we dene this
observation as \existing" (E). Third, if we observe a borrower for the rst time in 1996
or any subsequent year, we classify the borrower as \new", denoted with N in Figure
4. Subsequent observations of this same borrower would then be included in the set of
existing borrowers (see borrowers 3 and 4 in the gure).
To examine whether the adjustment in credit quality of the banks primarily came
about through changes in screening or changes in monitoring, we compare the changes in
Z-Scores for these two subsamples. The results are presented in Table 10. We observe a
trend towards higher Z-Scores (corresponding to a reduction in risk) both for new and for
existing borrowers after the removal of the guarantees. However, the increase is stronger
for new (0.49) than for existing borrowers (0.36). The dierence of 0.13 is statistically
signicant at the 10% level. Overall, we nd that banks both dropped riskier existing
borrowers (monitoring) and tightened lending standards for new borrowers (screening),
with a slightly stronger emphasis on tightening standards for new borrowers.
5.6 Bank level loan volume eects
In the previous sections we observed a reduction of risk taking after the removal of gov-
ernment guarantees. This reduction was larger if the ex ante value of the guarantees was
higher and if the savings banks' ex ante risk was higher. We interpreted the results to
imply that savings banks cut o the riskiest existing borrowers from credit and tightened
22their lending standards for new borrowers. This change in policies should be observable
in overall bank loan volumes. We already documented that the aggregate market share of
savings banks declined after the removal of guarantees (see Figure 3). In this section we
examine whether the changes in loan volumes of individual savings banks are consistent
with the aggregate patterns and whether changes are larger for banks for which the ex
ante value of the guarantees may have been higher.
In order to construct loan volume gures, we aggregate all loans to commercial
borrowers per savings bank in each year. We also use the average level of credit risk
(Z-Score) and the average interest spread over all borrowers at a group of savings banks
of a given year as control variables. In contrast to the regressions on the borrower level,
we use Total bank assets, Number mergers, and Downgrade on the savings bank level
as in this specication we do not need to match these variables with borrower level data.
We start with a brief description of the savings bank level data set. For 457 savings
banks we have 4,708 bank level observations in 1996 - 2006 after excluding observations
with missing values for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Despite their obligation
to serve the \common good" (see section 2), the saving banks in our sample are on average
relatively protable: average pre-tax ROE is 12.8%. The average cost to income ratio is
82.1%. Despite the dierences in governance, savings banks appear very similar to private
commercial banks of comparable size in continental Europe. Pre-tax ROE of commercial
banks in Europe is 12.1% in continental Europe and 13.1% in the UK (317 banks, 1996-
2004, data is from Bankscope). Similarly, cost to income ratios are 80.1% in continental
Europe and 66.8% in the UK. Further descriptive statistics of the variables used below in
the regression are reported in Panel A of Table 11. The average aggregate credit volume
to commercial borrowers is Euro 544 million. The average savings bank has around Euro
1.9 billion of total assets and seems unlikely to be considered \too big to fail". The other
control variables are as in the borrower level data set described in Table 2.20
We then run the same regressions as for the borrower level data. We present the
20Number mergers is much lower as this ratio is now calculated per savings bank instead of per group of savings banks.
23results in specications (I) to (III) in Table 12.21 Specication (I) uses the dummy variable
NoStateG (which equals 0 before 2001 and 1 for the years of 2001 - 2006) to estimate
the baseline time series eect. We nd that the overall credit volume of savings banks
declined signicantly (at the 1% level) after the removal of the public guarantees. On
average, savings banks reduced their loan volume by Euro 125 million, which corresponds
to 22% of the commercial loan volume of the average savings bank. Specication (IIa)
applies the dierence-in-dierences approach from Table 6 and interacts NoStateG with
the downgrade severity of the federal state bank. While banks with a likely higher ex
ante value of public guarantees reduce their lending to commercial borrowers more than
those with a lower value, the dierence-in-dierences term is not statistically signicant.
Third, specication (IIb) applies the dierence-in-dierence approach from Table 7 and
interacts NoStateG with the value of the ex ante riskiness of the savings banks. However,
the dierence-in-dierences eect is very small and not signicant. Fourth, as in Table
8 we use two dummy variables to indicate the periods 1996-2000 (StateG) and 2004-06
(IntroRW). 2001-03 is excluded as before. The results are reported in specication (III)
of Table 12. We continue to nd a signicant reduction of the loan volume at the bank
level for the period 2001-03 and a further reduction after 2004. Hence, the main results
found previously at the borrower level seem to go through when considering overall loan
volumes of savings banks, although statistical signicance is lower, which we attribute to
the much smaller sample size.
6 Conclusion
The results in this paper show that government guarantees are associated with strong
moral hazard eects. The approach taken in the paper permits a unique identication of
21Univariate results for the eect on credit volumes at the savings bank level in Panel B of Table 11 show on average
a reduction in credit volume of Euro 42 million after the removal of government guarantees. This is 7.4% of the average
loan volume of savings banks. While the reduction of credit volumes was higher if the ex ante value of the government
guarantees was higher (Euro 61 million compared to Euro 37 million) the dierence-in-dierences (minus Euro 24 million)
is negative but not signicant. Results are similar for the ex ante risk level of the savings banks (before the removal). High
risk savings banks reduced their risk to a larger extend (Euro 63 million) than low risk savings banks (Euro 19 million) did.
The dierence-in-dierences (minus Euro 44 million), however, is again negative but not signicant.
24the eects of government guarantees on bank risk taking. One, the removal of guarantees
was exogenously imposed on the sample banks. The change in the safety net that we
examine was unrelated to a nancial incident, but rather based on a European court
decision. Second, the banks in the sample are small and, therefore, unlikely to be \too
big to fail". Hence, we can exclude the possibility that explicit government guarantees
were simply replaced by implicit guarantees, which may have similar eects on bank risk
taking and also be associated with moral hazard (Gropp et al., 2009). Third, the data
permit a link between the balance sheet information of the banks and the balance sheet
information of their commercial loan customers. Savings banks largely operate along
traditional banking lines with little o-balance sheet operations. Hence, we are able to
measure their risk taking comprehensively by examining the Z-Score of their commercial
loan customers.
We nd that the removal of government guarantees not only signicantly decreased
the risk taking of banks, but we also show that after the removal of guarantees, banks
reduced average loan size and overall lending volume. At the same time, banks increased
interest rates for loans on the remaining borrowers. Riskier borrowers were either denied
credit or were given a smaller loan. The eects are economically substantial: Z-Scores
increased on average by 7%, loan sizes declined by 13%, interest rate spreads increased
by 57 basis points, and overall loan volume declined by 22%. We nd that these eects
tend to be signicantly larger for banks, where it is likely that the ex ante value of
guarantees was higher. Finally, we show that the savings banks adjusted their risk taking
both by dropping existing risky borrowers from their loan books (monitoring) and by
tightening their lending standards for new borrowers (screening). The results suggest that
some borrowers, generally the riskiest ones, lost access to credit due to the removal of
guarantees.
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29FIGURE 1: Distribution of Z-Scores before and after the removal of public guarantees
The gure shows the distribution of the Z-Score before (1996-2000) and after (2001-2006) the removal of
government guarantees. The Z-Score is dened in Table 1. We use univariate kernel density estimation


































Distribution of Z-Scores before and after discontinuation of public guarantees
StateG
NoStateG
30FIGURE 2: Economic developments in Germany
The gure shows annual GDP growth in Germany during our sample period. Data are taken from the

























31FIGURE 3: Market share of savings banks in Germany
The gure shows the annual loan volume of savings banks as a percentage of the total loan volume to






















32FIGURE 4: Sample selection - Screening versus monitoring
The gure shows how we dene the two subsamples of new and existing borrowers used for Table 10.
It illustrates four exemplary borrowers of a given bank. All observations for 1995, denoted by B, are
excluded. If we observe a borrower in 1995 and 1996 or a subsequent year, we dene this observation as
\existing" (E). If we observe a borrower for the rst time in 1996 or any subsequent year, we classify the
borrower as \new", denoted with N. Subsequent observations of this borrower are classied as existing
borrower (E).
06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95
E E E E N 4
E E  E E E N 3
E E E E E E E E E E E B 2












New and existing 
borrowers
33TABLE 1: Denition of dependent and independent variables
The table gives the denitions of all variables used in the empirical analysis. EBIL stands for the proprietary data set of borrowers' balance sheets
and income statements. Destatis is the federal statistical oce of Germany.
Variable name Description Denition/Source
Dependent variables
Z Score Altman's Z-Score calibrated to the German banking market (approximation of the credit risk
of each individual loan customer), dened by
EBIL
Z Score = 0.717 * Working capital/Assets + 0.847 * Retained earnings/Assets +
3.107 * Net profits/Assets + 0.420 * Net worth/Liabilities + 0.998 * Sales/Assets
Loan size Commercial borrowers liabilities towards the savings bank EBIL
Interest rate spread Interest rate spread of commercial borrower (approximated by interest expenses over total loan
volumes minus the annual return of ve-year German government bonds as the risk-free rate)
for customers with at least 50% of credit volumes from savings banks
EBIL, Bundesbank
Independent variables
Total bank assets Aggregated total assets of groups of savings banks Savings banks
Downgrade Downgrade of federal state bank in numerical rating notches which was due to the removal of
state guarantees (cf. Table 5)
S&P's, Moody's
Direct competition Branches of direct competitors (commercial banks and cooperative banks) to savings banks
branches per group of savings banks
Bundesbank
Number mergers Number of mergers within a group of savings banks per year Savings banks
Local GDP Level of local GDP per group of savings banks Destatis
 GDP Relative change in GDP per group of savings banks Destatis
Indebtedness Debt per capita of the community that the savings bank is located in Destatis
Risk-free interest rate Average daily risk-free interest rate at the national level Bundesbank
Industry Two-digit industry classication of commercial borrower EBIL
Dummy and interaction variables
StateG Dummy variables for removal of government guarantees (before removal of state guarantees) 1 for years 1996 - 2000
NoStateG Dummy variables for removal of government guarantees (after removal of state guarantees) 1 for years 2001 - 2006
StateGXLowDowng Dummy variables for interaction of removal of government guarantees with ex ante value of
guarantees, approximated by the sharpness of downgrade of the federal state bank
1 for 1996-2000 if Downgrade  2.5
NoStateGXLowDowng 1 for 2001-2006 if Downgrade  2.5
NoStateGXHighDowng 1 for 2001-2006 if Downgrade > 2.5
StateGXLowRisk Dummy variables for interaction of removal of government guarantees with ex ante riskiness of
the savings bank group, measured as the average Z-Score for the years 1996-2000
1 for 1996-2000 if ex ante risk  median
NoStateGXLowRisk 1 for 2001-2006 if ex ante risk  median
NoStateGXHighRisk 1 for 2001-2006 if ex ante risk > median




4TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics
This table shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The denitions of variables are given in Table 1. We provide the
number of observations, means, standard deviations, and the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% percentiles.
Variable Unit N Mean SD 5p 25p 50p 75p 95p
Z Score - 230,562 2.49 2.12 0.18 1.13 2.11 3.38 6.11
Loan size EUR mn 230,562 0.530 1.025 0.022 0.092 0.215 0.501 2.064
Interest rate spread Percent 230,562 6.68 19.65 0.12 2.11 3.53 5.93 17.17
Total bank assets EUR bn 230,562 15.31 11.69 5.46 9.04 11.59 16.37 39.16
Downgrade Notches 230,562 2.54 0.95 1.50 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00
Direct competition - 230,562 0.90 0.25 0.48 0.75 0.88 1.03 1.36
Number mergers - 230,562 0.24 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Local GDP EUR bn 230,562 37.02 34.88 9.98 20.47 27.55 37.55 82.80
 GDP Percent 230,562 0.74 1.87 -2.01 -0.35 0.60 1.89 3.33
Indebtedness EUR thousands 230,562 1.04 0.38 0.62 0.82 0.96 1.17 1.83
Risk-free interest rate Percent 230,562 2.95 0.75 2.05 2.32 2.84 3.28 4.37
3
5TABLE 3: Univariate analysis
The table shows the results of a univariate analysis of the impact of the removal of government
guarantees on credit risk (Z Score), loan sizes (in millions of Euros), and interest rate spreads (in
percent). The sample includes 230,562 observations. Government guarantees were in place in 1996-2000,
and government guarantees were not in place in 2001-06. Panel A: low/high downgrade stands for savings
banks for which the respective federal state bank experienced a low/high downgrade (see Table 5). Panel
B: High/low ex ante risk stands for savings banks below/above average Z-Score prior to removal of
guarantees. The dierences in column 3 show a comparison before and after the removal of government
guarantees. In column 3, *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using
univariate OLS with standard errors clustered at the savings bank group level.
Variable 1996-2000 2001-06 Dierence
Panel A: Downgrade of federal state banks
Z Score
Overall 2.36 2.56 0.20***
Low downgrade 2.37 2.53 0.16***
High downgrade 2.34 2.62 0.28***
Loan size
Overall 0.582 0.504 -0.078***
Low downgrade 0.553 0.507 -0.046*
High downgrade 0.642 0.497 -0.145***
Interest rate spread
Overall 5.94 7.06 1.12***
Low downgrade 6.22 7.14 0.92***
High downgrade 5.37 6.90 1.54***
Panel B: Ex ante risk level
Z Score
Overall 2.36 2.56 0.20***
Low ex ante risk 2.57 2.65 0.08**
High ex ante risk 2.17 2.46 0.29***
Loan size
Overall 0.582 0.504 -0.078***
Low ex ante risk 0.602 0.543 -0.059
High ex ante risk 0.565 0.459 -0.106***
Interest rate spread
Overall 5.94 7.06 1.12***
Low ex ante risk 6.53 7.34 0.81***
High ex ante risk 5.43 6.75 1.32***
36TABLE 4: Impact of the removal of government guarantees
The table contains the result of OLS regressions which analyze the impact of removal of government
guarantees on credit risk (Z Score), loan size, and interest rate spread on the borrower level. Panel A
shows the results of pooled OLS regressions while Panel B shows the results using xed eects on the
savings bank group level. NoStateG equals 0 before 2001 and 1 for the years of 2001 - 2006. The control
variables are all lagged by one year, except the downgrade of the federal state bank, Downgrade, the
debt per capita per group of savings banks, Indebtedness, the absolute level of local GDP, Local GDP,
as well as the relative change in local GDP,  GDP, the branches of direct competitors (commercial
banks and cooperative banks) to savings banks branches per group of savings banks, Direct competition,
the number of mergers within the group of savings banks per year, Number mergers, and the average
daily interest rate in basis points, Risk-free interest rate. All specications include two-digit industry
dummies (coecients omitted from the table). Standard errors are clustered at the savings banks' group
level. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Independent variables Z Score Loan size Interest rate spread
Panel A: Standard OLS
NoStateG 0.172*** -0.077*** 0.569***
Z Score -0.084*** 0.674***
Loan size -0.332*** -1.164***
Interest rate spread 0.007*** -0.003***
Total bank assets 0.004 0.008** 0.027
Downgrade 0.084*** 0.021 -0.141
Indebtedness -0.247*** -0.049 0.026
Local GDP 0.001 -0.002* 0.004
 GDP 0.904 0.379 -2.205
Direct competition -0.219** 0.029 0.131
Number mergers -0.026* -0.014* -0.133
Risk-free interest rate -0.055*** 0.018*** -0.577***
Intercept 2.270*** 0.438*** 4.125***
Observations 230,562 230,562 230,562
Adj:R
2 0.102 0.080 0.014
Panel B: With xed eects
NoStateG 0.120*** -0.090*** 0.696***
Z Score -0.085*** 0.653***
Loan size -0.337*** -1.203***
Interest rate spread 0.007*** -0.003***
Total bank assets -0.063*** 0.023** -0.083
Indebtedness -0.039 -0.062** 0.578
Local GDP 0.030*** -0.004 -0.002
 GDP 0.178 0.113 -4.584*
Direct competition -0.236*** -0.040 0.109
Number mergers -0.019 -0.007 -0.040
Risk-free interest rate -0.023** 0.017*** -0.561***
Intercept 2.137*** 0.447*** 5.059***
Number of bank groups 65 65 65
Observations 230,562 230,562 230,562
Within R
2 0.100 0.077 0.013
37TABLE 5: Impact of removal of government guarantees on credit ratings of German federal state banks
The table gives Moody's and S&P's rating changes for the German federal state banks before and after the removal of government guarantees. The
unguaranteed rating is as of July 19, 2005. In addition it shows the rating downgrade of the rating agencies after the loss of government guarantees of
the federal state banks in numerical rating notches. Credit ratings are taken from the rating agencies' websites.




Guaranteed Aaa Aaa Aa2 Aa2 Aa3 Aaa Aa2
Unguaranteed Aa1 Aa2 A1 Aa3 A1 Aa2 A1
Downgrade 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
S & P
Guaranteed AA+ AAA AA- - AA- AA+ AA
Unguaranteed A+ A A- Aa3 A A BBB+
Downgrade 3 6 3 - 2 2 5
Downgrade intensity low high low low low low high
3
8TABLE 6: Ex ante value of guarantees: Federal state bank downgrade
The table contains the dierence-in-dierences result of OLS regressions which analyze the impact of
removal of government guarantees in dependence on the ex ante value of guarantees for the following
variables: credit risk (Z Score), loan size, and interest rate spread on the borrower level. We approximate
the ex ante value of guarantees by the severity of the federal state bank downgrade. The control variables
are dened as in Table 4. Wald tests for the dierence-in-dierences terms are reported at the bottom
of the table. All specications include two-digit industry dummies (not reported). Standard errors are
clustered at the savings banks' group level. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Independent variables Z Score Loan size Interest rate spread
(1) NoStateGXHighDowng 0.250*** -0.129*** 0.931***
(2) NoStateGXLowDowng 0.064 -0.141*** 1.042***
(3) StateGXLowDowng -0.071 -0.090* 0.658*
Z Score -0.084*** 0.673***
Loan size -0.332*** -1.162***
Interest rate spread 0.007*** -0.003***
Total bank assets 0.005 0.007** 0.030
Indebtedness -0.233*** -0.046 0.021
Local GDP 0.001 -0.002* 0.003
 GDP 0.893 0.419 -2.365
Direct competition -0.172* 0.037 0.092
Number mergers -0.022 -0.015* -0.128
Risk-free interest rate -0.056*** 0.018*** -0.577***
Intercept 2.463*** 0.540*** 3.371***
Dierence (1) 0.250*** -0.129*** 0.931***
Dierence (2)-(3) 0.135*** -0.051** 0.384***
Dierence-in-dierences (1)-[(2)-(3)] 0.115** -0.078* 0.547**
Observations 230,562 230,562 230,562
Adj:R2 0.102 0.080 0.014
39TABLE 7: Ex ante value of guarantees: Ex ante risk of savings banks
The table contains the dierence-in-dierences result of OLS regressions which analyze the impact of
removal of government guarantees in dependence on the ex ante value of guarantees for the following
variables: credit risk (Z Score), loan size, and interest rate spread on the borrower level. We approximate
the ex ante value of guarantees by the ex ante risk taking of savings banks. The control variables are
dened as in Table 4. Wald tests for the dierence-in-dierences terms are reported at the bottom of the
table. All specications include two-digit industry dummies (not reported). Standard errors are clustered
at the savings banks' group level. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Independent variables Z Score Loan size Interest rate spread
(1) NoStateGXHighRisk 0.257*** -0.093*** 0.743***
(2) NoStateGXLowRisk 0.456*** -0.017 1.136***
(3) StateGXLowRisk 0.382*** 0.045 0.767**
Z Score -0.085*** 0.666***
Loan size -0.334*** -1.170***
Interest rate spread 0.007*** -0.003***
Total bank assets -0.009** 0.005 0.001
Downgrade 0.069*** 0.017 -0.171
Indebtedness -0.165*** -0.025 0.188
Local GDP 0.005*** -0.001 0.011
 GDP 0.837 0.363 -2.341
Direct competition -0.076 0.067 0.415
Number mergers -0.008 -0.011 -0.098
Risk-free interest rate -0.057*** 0.018*** -0.581***
Intercept 1.959*** 0.378*** 3.521***
Dierence (1) 0.257*** -0.093*** 0.743***
Dierence (2)-(3) 0.073** -0.062* 0.369**
Dierence-in-dierences (1)-[(2)-(3)] 0.184*** -0.031 0.374*
Observations 230,562 230,562 230,562
Adj:R2 0.105 0.081 0.014
40TABLE 8: The introduction of risk based regulation and prompt corrective action
The table contains the result of OLS regressions which analyze the introduction of risk weighted provisions
for the group-wide reserve funds in the year 2004 on credit risk (Z Score), loan size, and interest rate
spread on the borrower level. We use two dummy variables which indicate the periods 1996-2000 (StateG)
and 2004-06 (IntroRW) and exclude as reference category the period 2001-03. The control variables are
dened as in Table 4. All specications include two-digit industry dummies (not reported). Standard
errors are clustered at the savings banks' group level. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
Independent variables Z Score Loan size Interest rate spread
StateG -0.105*** 0.082*** -0.631***
IntroRW 0.205*** 0.014 -0.189
Z Score -0.084*** 0.675***
Loan size -0.333*** -1.164***
Interest rate spread 0.007*** -0.003***
Total bank assets 0.005 0.008** 0.026
Downgrade 0.082*** 0.021 -0.139
Indebtedness -0.239*** -0.048 0.019
Local GDP 0.001 -0.002* 0.004
 GDP 0.071 0.321 -1.436
Direct competition -0.172** 0.032 0.088
Number mergers -0.004 -0.013 -0.153
Risk-free interest rate 0.009 0.023*** -0.636***
Intercept 2.104*** 0.338*** 5.004***
Observations 230,562 230,562 230,562
Adj:R2 0.103 0.080 0.014
41TABLE 9: SUR specication
The table shows the result of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models which simultaneously estimate
the impact of the removal of government guarantees on credit risk (Z Score), loan size, and interest rate
spreads of commercial borrowers. Results for credit risk are shown in Panel A, for loan size in Panel B, and
for interest rate spread in Panel C. In specication (I) NoStateG equals 0 before 2001 and 1 for the years
of 2001 - 2006 to identify the eect of the removal of government guarantees, specication (IIa) uses the
dierence in the sharpness of downgrade of the respective federal state banks by combining before/after
the removal of government guarantees with high/low downgrade magnitude, specication (IIb) uses the
dierence in the ex ante riskiness of savings banks by combining before/after the removal of government
guarantees with high/low ex ante risk using the average Z-Score before the removal, specication (III)
uses two dummy variables for the periods 1996-2000 (StateG) and 2004-06 (IntroRW) to analyze the
introduction of risk weighted provisions for the group-wide reserve funds in 2004. The control variables
are dened as in Table 4 except the two left-hand side variables that were used in the other two regressions
in Tables 4 and 6-8. Wald tests for the dierence-in-dierences terms are reported at the bottom of the
table. All specications include two-digit industry dummies (not reported). Standard errors are clustered
at the savings banks' group level. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Independent variables (I) (IIa) (IIb) (III)
Baseline Downgrade
magnitude














Total bank assets 0.003 0.004 -0.010** 0.004
Downgrade 0.080*** 0.064*** 0.079***
Indebtedness -0.228*** -0.212*** -0.153*** -0.219***
Local GDP 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.001
 GDP 0.773 0.754 0.702 -0.061
Direct competition -0.232*** -0.185** -0.096 -0.185**
Number mergers -0.023 -0.020 -0.006 -0.002
Risk-free interest rate -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.059*** 0.006
Intercept 2.457*** 2.621*** 2.153*** 2.299***
Dierence (1) 0.275*** 0.271***
Dierence (2)-(3) 0.126*** 0.051
Dierence-in-dierences (1)-[(2)-(3)] 0.149*** 0.220***
42TABLE 9 continued
Independent variables (I) (IIa) (IIb) (III)
Baseline Downgrade
magnitude














Total bank assets 0.008** 0.007** 0.006* 0.008**
Downgrade 0.016 0.013 0.016
Indebtedness -0.028 -0.026 -0.012 -0.028
Local GDP -0.002** -0.002** -0.002 -0.002**
 GDP 0.356 0.401 0.346 0.360
Direct competition 0.050 0.056 0.075 0.050
Number mergers -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012
Risk-free interest rate 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026***
Intercept 0.320*** 0.417*** 0.288*** 0.230***
Dierence (1) -0.154*** -0.115***
Dierence (2)-(3) -0.060*** -0.068*
Dierence-in-dierences (1)-[(2)-(3)] -0.094** -0.047










Total bank assets 0.027 0.031 -0.005 0.026
Downgrade -0.094 -0.133 -0.093
Indebtedness -0.022 -0.014 0.160 -0.029
Local GDP 0.005 0.004 0.015 0.006
 GDP -3.074 -3.255 -3.251 -2.439
Direct competition -0.057 -0.060 0.280 -0.093
Number mergers -0.131 -0.122 -0.086 -0.148
Risk-free interest rate -0.580*** -0.581*** -0.583*** -0.629***
Intercept 6.667*** 5.932*** 5.892*** 7.538***
Dierence (1) 1.114*** 0.898***
Dierence (2)-(3) 0.369*** 0.266
Dierence-in-dierences (1)-[(2)-(3)] 0.745*** 0.631***
Observations 230,562 230,562 230,562 230,562
43TABLE 10: Screening versus monitoring
The table shows the average Z-Scores per year for newly approved borrowers (rst column) and existing
borrowers (second column). We require at least three observations per borrower and thus use a dierent
sample compared to Tables 2 to 9. The sample selection process is illustrated in Figure 4. The results are
broken down into two regimes. Panel A displays the years before while Panel B shows the years after the
removal of government guarantees. We test the dierences between the average Z-Scores before (1) and
after the removal (2) by using univariate OLS with standard errors clustered at the savings bank group
level. The last line reports the p value of the corresponding Wald test. *,**,*** indicate signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Average Z-Score
Year New borrowers Existing borrowers






(1) Average 3.09 2.80







(2) Average 3.59 3.15
Dierence (2) - (1) 0.49*** 0.36***
t statistic (6.27) (11.16 )
Dierence-in-dierences 0.13*
p value, Wald test (0.056)
44TABLE 11: Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis on the bank level
Panel A shows descriptive statistics at the savings bank level of all variables used for the regression analyses of the bank loan volume (section 5.5).
The denitions of variables are given in Table 1. In contrast to the regressions on the borrower level, we use the average Z-Score and the average
interest spread over all borrowers at a group of savings banks of a given year. We further use Total bank assets, Number mergers, and Downgrade
on the savings bank level as we do not need to match these variables with borrower level data. Panel B shows the results of a univariate analysis of
the impact of the removal of government guarantees on bank loan volumes (in billions of Euros). The number of observations is 4,708. The averages
are calculated for the two phases of the removal of government guarantees: government guarantees in place (1996-2000) and discontinued government
guarantees (2001-06). In the rst line, the results are broken down into dierent values of ex ante guarantees using our rst proxy: low/high downgrade
stands for savings banks for which the respective federal state bank experienced a low/high downgrade (see the last line in Table 5). In the second
line, the results are broken down into dierent values of ex ante guarantees using our second proxy: low/high ex ante risk stands for dierent levels of
ex ante riskiness of the savings banks before the removal of guarantees. The third column shows the comparisons of bank loan volume before and after
the removal of government guarantees. *,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using univariate OLS with standard
errors clustered at the savings bank level.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable Unit N Mean SD 5p 25p 50p 75p 95p
Bank loan volumes EUR bn 4,708 0.54 0.89 0.05 0.15 0.30 0.62 1.79
Z Score - 4,708 3.06 0.41 2.46 2.77 3.02 3.32 3.77
Interest rate spread Percent 4,708 3.45 0.67 2.23 2.99 3.47 3.94 4.44
Total bank assets EUR bn 4,708 1.88 2.51 0.25 0.67 1.18 2.18 5.46
Downgrade Notches 4,708 2.29 1.06 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 4.00
Indebtedness EUR thousands 4,708 1.07 0.36 0.64 0.86 1.00 1.19 1.80
Local GDP EUR bn 4,708 28.76 29.34 7.88 12.88 22.67 30.45 74.03
 GDP Percent 4,708 0.77 1.98 -2.16 -0.34 0.64 1.94 3.45
Direct competition - 4,708 0.86 0.27 0.45 0.67 0.84 1.00 1.36
Number mergers - 4,708 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Risk-free interest rate Percent 4,708 3.06 0.72 2.05 2.32 3.18 3.41 4.37
Panel B: Univariate analysis of the bank loan level
Regime 1996-2000 2001-06 Dierence
Downgrade of federal state
banks
Overall 0.567 0.525 -0.042*
Low downgrade 0.583 0.546 -0.037
High downgrade 0.515 0.455 -0.061***
Ex ante risk level
Overall 0.567 0.525 -0.042*
Low ex ante risk 0.649 0.631 -0.019
High ex ante risk 0.482 0.418 -0.063***
4
5TABLE 12: Impact of removal of government guarantees on bank loan volumes
The table contains the result of OLS regressions which analyze the impact of removal of government
guarantees on loan volumes on the bank level. In specication (I) NoStateG equals 0 before 2001 and 1
for the years of 2001 - 2006. Specication (IIa) uses the dierence in the rating downgrade magnitude of
the respective federal state banks. Specication (IIb) uses the dierence in the ex ante riskiness of savings
banks. Specication (III) uses two dummy variables for the periods 1996-2000 (StateG) and 2004-06
(IntroRW). Z Score, Interest rate spread, and Total bank assets are lagged by one year. Z Score and
Interest rate spread are on the savings bank group level. We use Total bank assets, Number mergers,
and Downgrade on the savings bank level as we do not need to match these variables with borrower level
data. The other control variables are dened as in Table 4. Wald tests for the dierence-in-dierences
terms are reported at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the savings bank level.
*,**,*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Independent variables (I) (IIa) (IIb) (III)
Baseline Downgrade
magnitude













Z Score 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.072***
Interest rate spread -0.019** -0.030*** -0.019** -0.011
Total bank assets 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349***
Downgrade -0.017* -0.017** -0.017*
Indebtedness -0.082* -0.076 -0.083** -0.081*
Local GDP 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0004* 0.0004
 GDP -0.294 -0.158 -0.292 -0.210
Direct competition 0.054* 0.072** 0.055** 0.053*
Number mergers -0.088** -0.086** -0.087** -0.090**
Risk-free interest rate 0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.0001
Intercept -0.119* -0.217*** -0.146** -0.248***
Dierence (1) -0.112*** -0.125***
Dierence (2)-(3) -0.131*** -0.130***
Dierence-in-dierences (1)-[(2)-(3)] 0.020 -0.005
Observations 4,708 4,708 4,708 4,708
Adj:R
2 0.914 0.915 0.914 0.914
46